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Wireless Mesh Networks (WMNs) represent a good solution to providing 
wireless Internet connectivity in a sizable geographic area; this new and 
promising paradigm allows for network deployment at a much lower cost 
than with classic WiFi networks. Standards-based wireless access takes 
advantage of the growing popularity of inexpensive Wi-Fi clients, 
enabling new service opportunities and applications that improve user 
productivity and responsiveness. The deployment of WMNs, are suffered 
by : (i) All, the communications being wireless and therefore prone to 
interference, present severe capacity and delay constraints, (ii)  The 
second reason that slows down the deployment of WMNs is the lack of 
security guarantees. Wireless mesh networks mostly susceptible to 
routing protocol threats and route disruption attacks. Most of these 
threats require packet injection with a specialized knowledge of the 
routing protocol; the threats to wireless mesh networks and are 
summarized as (i) External attacks: in which attackers not belonging to 
the network jam the communication or inject erroneous information, and 
(ii) Internal attacks: in which attackers are internal, compromised nodes 
that are difficult to be detected.  The MAC layers of WMN are subjected to 
the attacks like Eavesdropping, Link Layer Jamming Attack, MAC 
Spoofing Attack, and Replay Attack. The attacks in Network Layer are: 
Control Plane Attacks, Data Plane Attacks, Rushing attack, Wormhole 
attack, and Black Hole Attack. In this project work we are concern with 
the threats related to Network layer of WMN based upon 802.11i and 
analysis the performance of secure routing protocols and their 
performance against the intrusion detection. 
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1.1 Introduction  
 
Wireless mesh networks (WMN) are multi-radio, multi-hop networks with the ability 
of dynamically self organizing and self configuring. They can automatically establish 
ad hoc networks and maintain mesh connectivity between them. They are envisioned 
to be compatible and interoperable with existing wire line and wireless networks 
(conventional wireless, cellular networks, sensor networks) through gateways. 
WMN’s diversify the abilities of ad hoc networks as they are composed of mesh 
routers and mesh clients. Mesh clients exhibit pure ad hoc behavior by performing 
routing and self configuration. The mesh routers are the main addition, on top of 
providing a mesh of self-configuring and self-healing Links among themselves, they 
also provide a gateway functionality which enables integration with existing wireless 
and wire line networks. A mesh router also contains additional routing functions to 
support mesh networking. A wireless mesh router should be able to achieve the same 
coverage compared to a conventional wireless router but with lower transmission 
power. Hence, even though they exhibit ad hoc behavior, they still have a network 
architecture associated; this can be manipulated when looking towards intrusion 
detection techniques.  
There are primarily three networks Architectures associated with wireless mesh 
networks [1]. There is the infrastructure or backbone architecture which is solely 
composed of mesh routers. This is considered as backbone architecture as it provides 
infrastructure to wired and wireless clients. This allows integration of mesh networks 
with already existing communication networks. The second architecture considered is 
the client wireless mesh network architecture which is comprised of mesh clients that 
provide peer to peer networks among client devices.  
The main difference between mesh clients and mesh routers is that clients only have 
one wireless interface and less computational abilities. Finally the hybrid architecture 
Chapter  
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is composed of the backbone and client meshing architectures. This way, the 
infrastructure provides connectivity to other networks [ 3] And the routing abilities of 
clients provide improved connectivity and coverage within the mesh network. 
 
1.2 Literature Review 
 
For any application (not necessarily on WMNs), the following general goals are desired 
to ensure security. 
 Confidentiality or Privacy: The communication between users must be secured 
such that the information cannot be disclosed to any eavesdroppers. 
 Integrity: The whole transmission paths must be protected to ensure the messages 
are not illegally altered or replayed during the transmission. 
 Availability: Applications should provide reliable delivery of messages against 
denial of service (DoS). 
 Authentication: When a user sends messages, there should be some processes to 
identify the user to ensure the messages are really sent by the claimed sender 
rather than fabricated by someone else. 
 Authorization: Before any user performs some tasks, there should be mechanism to 
ensure the corresponding users have the right to do them. 
 Accounting: When a user is using some services, some process should be able to 
measure the resources the user consumes for billing information. 
 X
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Threats and Vulnerabilities in Different layer of WMN 
                            
LAYER Attacks 
Application Layer Repudition, data corruption 
Transport Layer Session hijacking, SYN flooding 
Network layer Wormhole, blackhole, Byzantine, 
Flooding, resource consumption, location 
disclosure attack 
Data link Layer Traffic analysis, monitoring, disruption 
MAC(802.11) WEP weakness 
Physical Layer Jamming, interceptions, eavesdropping 
Multi-layer attacks Dos, impersonation, replay, man-in-the-
middle 
 
 
 
In our project we are considering the attack in the Network Layer, the threats to this layer 
is summarized as following: 
Routing Protocol Threats 
 
Wireless mesh networks may be susceptible to routing protocol threats and route 
disruption attacks. Many of these threats require packet injection with a specialized 
knowledge of the routing protocol however, these threats are unique to wireless mesh 
networks and are summarized below: 
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 Black-hole. An attacker creates forged packets to impersonate a valid mesh node 
and subsequently drop packets, where attracting packets involves advertising 
routes as low-cost. 
  Grey-hole. An attacker creates forged packets to attack and selectively drops, 
routes or inspects network traffic. 
  Worm-hole. Routing control messages are replayed from one network location 
to another, which can severely disrupt routing. 
  Route error injection. An attacker disrupts routing by injected forged route 
error message to break mesh links. Relative to the other routing attacks, this 
attack conceivably has high exploitability because it does not require detailed 
knowledge of the routing protocol state model (e.g., a replay attack is possible, 
and route errors are typically stateless). 
Metro-WiFi Public Access Threats: 
 
 Spoofing of wireless infrastructure. An attacker uses an “evil twin” or 
“man-in-the-middle”attack to execute an information disclosure threat. In an 
enterprise deployment, such attacks are mitigated using EAP methods that allow 
mutual authentication between a client and the infrastructure (e.g., EAP-TTLS, 
EAP-TLS or EAP-PEAP). 
 Denial-of-service attack. An attacker may either use IP flooding as well as 
attacking network services, or 802.11 MAC management attacks. The 802.11i-
based link level security model supports authentication, key distribution and 
encryption for mesh management frames, whereMAC management frame 
protection is not addressed within 802.11s. 
 
 Theft-of-service attack. An attacker steals valid user credentials or performs 
paid-user session hijacking (e.g., “freeloading”). Many Wi-Fi systems use a 
service gateway or captive portal to secure paid access – a captive portal uses 
SSL-secured Web page where users authorization credentials. After 
authentication, the captive portal authorizes the client to network access by 
registering the valid client MAC and IP addresses in the gateway. Alternatively, 
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malicious users could relay traffic across the mesh network without traversing a 
network gateway (e.g., peer-to peer traffic across the mesh backhaul) 
 
1.2.2 Network Topology  
 
In a wireless mesh network all Aps may or may not have direct connection to the 
network gateways. Hence they need to forward their through the network to reach the 
gateway. Again we may extend the access to the gateway by forming a mesh topology 
between the mobile nodes as happens in case of ad-hoc networking. There exists a 
connection between every pair of nodes in the network realm in a wireless mesh 
topology. There are two types of mesh topologies as follows:  
 Full Mesh Topology: Every node is connected to every other node in the network. Full 
mesh topology yields greatest amount of redundancy, hence difficult to realize in a large 
scale using mesh routers, but small areas like small campus or offices may be ideal.  
But if any router fails, then the packet can be routed through other routers. Hence the 
network is robust and fault-tolerant.  
Partial Mesh Topology: Some nodes are arranged in full mesh topology but others are 
only connected to one or more nodes in the network. This is realizable for small to large 
scale networks fulfilling the requirements. This can be of following types:  
1) Point-to-Point 
2) Point-to-Multipoint or Multipoint-to-Point 
3) Multipoint-to-Multipoint 
4) Metropolitan  
 Mixed Node Topology: A mixed node topology is the complex form of wireless 
network which is composed of two radios and two high gain antennas in direct 
communication with each other and a third party wireless bridge/repeater. Though the 
links are quick to deploy but not scalable to create a large network. Clients may use these 
bridge/router nodes in an indoor environment and the main benefit so achieved is low 
installment cost.  
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Topology has a great impact on the performance of any routing protocol been applied. 
Logical Arrangement of nodes under an AP and arrangement of routers in the network 
plays big role in packet transmission. The routing algorithms are been broadly classified 
basing upon following criterion: [4]  
 Routing Philosophy: Routing approaches can be viewed as proactive, reactive and 
hybrid type. In proactive ones, paths are established regardless of if there exist any data 
to transmit. In reactive, path is established on-demand. Hybrid protocols implement both 
type of path establishment.  
 Network Organization: Network may follow flat organization where all nodes have 
same role to play but in hierarchical organization some nodes may have specialized 
functions. Super nodes may exist for various network management works.  
Location Awareness: Routers may or may not have any information about location of 
various nodes in the network.  
 Mobility Management: WMN has to manage the mobility of nodes throughout the 
network. As nodes move about, they change their logical position, the corresponding they 
attached to. But there exists several issues that need to be taken care of separately 
 
1.3 Organization of the Thesis 
 
 The whole thesis is organized into 5 chapters. Chapter 1 introduces 
Wireless Mesh Network and presents the overview of this thesis work. It also 
presents the literature review of Security problem. Chapter 2 presents the present 
security Issues and their impact on the performance. Chapter 3 deals with the 
introduction of different secure protocols proposed for the security of Wireless 
Mesh Networks. Chapter 4 presents the results obtained by comparing the two 
secure protocols in terms of some metrics. Chapter 5 deals with Fault detection 
and Isolation in Wireless mesh networks.  At last, the report comprises of future 
enhancements and conclusion to this thesis work followed by references used for 
this work. 
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1.4 Conclusion 
 
 In this chapter, introduction and overview of 
this thesis work is presented. The background for 
this thesis work is given. There exist different 
types of attacks which can be performed on the 
Wireless Mesh Networks. Wireless mesh networks 
mostly susceptible to routing protocol threats and 
route disruption attacks. Most of these threats 
require packet injection with a specialized 
knowledge of the routing protocol. In this project 
work we are concern with the threats related to 
Network layer of WMN based upon 802.11i and 
analysis the performance of secure routing 
protocols and their performance against the 
intrusion detection. 
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Chapter  
    2       Issues in Wireless mesh 
Networks 
    
2.1 Introduction 
In this chapter we discuss important aspects that must be taken into account in wireless 
mesh networks, such as the throughput capacity, fairness, reliability and robustness, and 
resource management. 
 
 Security is a major issue in both wired and wireless networks. In a wired network, 
the transmission medium can be physically secured, and access to the network as well. 
On the other hand, in a wireless network, security is more difficult to implement, since 
the transmission medium is open to anyone within the geographical range of a 
transmitter. In recent years, many security schemes have been proposed for Ad hoc 
wireless networks that can also be applicable to WMNs. However, these schemes are not 
good enough to be implemented in real scenarios. Moreover, because the difference in 
infrastructure between Ad hoc and WMN, some proposed solutions for the first are 
ineffective for the later.[1][16] In order to better understand the security issue, we need to 
learn what attacks exist. 
2.2 Theoretical Throughput Capacity. 
 
In data communication systems, throughput is defined as the number of bits, or 
characters (data) per unit of time that is delivered over a wired or wireless medium [13]. 
As an example, we could say that throughput is the amount of data per second passing 
through a wire connecting two computers. Then, the total network capacity is the 
maximum throughput of a node or communication link. [14]defines the throughput 
capacity as the maximum feasible throughput pi with high probability (asymptotically 
approaching to 1), where pi is the arrival rate in bits per second, and every node in the 
network sends data with a high probability to its chosen destination. Thus, the throughput 
pi is feasible. In WMNs, one of its big limitations is the network capacity[14][12]. The 
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theoretical upper limit of every node throughput capacity is asymptotically limited by pi 
(1/√n) where n is the number of nodes in the network. Therefore, increasing the number 
of nodes, the throughput capacity per node becomes unacceptably low. In general, the 
throughput capacity achievable in a WMN is proportional to the pi (W × n−1/d) where d 
is the dimension of the network and W is the total bandwidth. One approach to improve 
the throughput capacity is the use of multiple radio and fine tuned protocols.WMN nodes 
have a more limited throughput capacity in a single-channel system than in a multi-
channel system. Moreover, other factors contribute to the throughput degradation such as 
characteristics of MAC protocol, the hidden terminal problem, the exposed node 
problem, and the error rate in the wireless channel; which have more effect in a single-
channel system. 
 
2.2 Resource Management 
 
Resource management means the efficient management of network resources 
such as energy, bandwidth, interfaces, and storage. For example, if we consider a node 
with two interfaces, one low-power node and another regular one, then the WMN can use 
efficiently the energy resources. The overall power consumption, even in idle mode, 
depends very much on the type of interface. Therefore, in an IEEE 802.11-based WMN 
with limited energy reserve, an additional low-power and low data rate interface can be 
used to carry out-of-band signaling information to control the high-power and high-data 
rate data interface. Bandwidth resources can also be managed better in a multi-radio 
environment. For example, the load balancing across multiple interfaces could avoid a 
channel to get very congested and therefore a possible bottleneck. In addition, the 
bandwidth of each interface could be aggregated to obtain a high effective data rate. 
Finally, in such a bandwidth aggregation mechanism (bandwidth striping), dynamic 
packet scheduling can be utilized to obtain an even better performance. 
 
2.3 Fairness 
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Fairness, from the MAC perspective, can be achieved if the MAC protocol does 
not present preference for any single node when multiple nodes are trying to access the 
same channel. Then, we can say that the bandwidth is shared fairly[15]. WMN single-
radio nodes also face high throughput unfairness. We say that a network has high 
throughput fairness if all nodes get equal throughput under similar conditions of source 
traffic and network load. WMNs show high throughput unfairness among the contending 
traffic flows especially when CSMA/CA-based MAC protocols are employed for 
contention resolution. Three important properties associated with CSMA/CA-based MAC 
protocols, when used in a WMN environment are: (i) information asymmetry, (ii) 
location dependent contention, and (iii) half-duplex character of single-channel systems. 
Information asymmetry is caused by the lack of information at certain nodes, but also 
having excessive information may also contribute to throughput unfairness. For example, 
when a node is exposed to two flows, its Network Allocation Vector (NAV) is always set 
and therefore abstains from transmitting. In addition, the half-duplex property of a single-
interface system is another property that causes high throughput unfairness in a single-
radio WMN. Due to the half-duplex characteristics, no node can simultaneously receive 
and transmit over the network.  
 
2.4 Reliability And Robustness  
 
WMNs improve the reliability and robustness of communication. The partial 
mesh topology in a WMN provides high reliability and path diversity against node and 
link failures. Multi-Radio WMNs (MR-WMN) provide the most important advantage for 
robustness in communication diversity. For example, in wireless systems channel errors 
can be very high compared to wired networks; therefore, graceful degradation of 
communication quality during high channel errors is necessary. The use of multiple radio 
interfaces allows frequency diversity; therefore instead of having a full loss of 
connectivity, we achieve graceful degradation. Moreover, MRWMNs can use appropriate 
radio switching modules to achieve fault tolerance in communication either by switching 
the radios, channels, or by using multiple radios simultaneously. 
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2.5 Security 
 
Security is a major issue in both wired and wireless networks. In a wired network, 
the transmission medium can be physically secured, and access to the network as well. 
On the other hand, in a wireless network, security is more difficult to implement, since 
the transmission medium is open to anyone within the geographical range of a 
transmitter. In recent years, many security schemes have been proposed for Ad hoc 
wireless networks that can also be applicable to WMNs. However, these schemes are not 
good enough to be implemented in real scenarios. Moreover, because the difference in 
infrastructure between Ad hoc and WMN, some proposed solutions for the first are 
ineffective for the later.[1][16] In order to better understand the security issue, we need to 
learn what attacks exist. Attacks can be seen from a general perspective as active and 
passive attacks [2], and from the network layer, specifically with respect to routing 
protocols [17]. In active attacks, information is injected into the network by replicating, 
modifying or deleting exchanged data. On the other hand, in passive attacks, one subtype 
is passive eavesdropping, where the attacker intents to discover nodes information by 
listening to ongoing traffic. 
From the routing perspective, [17] identifies several specific attacks targeting the 
operation of a routing protocol. 
 
1. Location Disclosure: It happens when the attacker tries to obtain network information 
such as the location of a node, or the network structure. 
2. Black Hole: In this attack, false routing advertising is injected in such a way that the 
attacker is able to capture most packets from other nodes with the purpose of 
eavesdropping, or perform denial of service by dropping all received packets. 
3. Replay: In replay attack, previously captured routing traffic is sent back into the 
network to target new routes. 
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4. Wormhole: This attack requires two malicious nodes where one node captures routing 
traffic, and sends it to the other malicious node. Then, the second node can send back 
selective information to the network. 
5. Blackmail: Here, the attacker can fabricate a list to block nodes and inject it into the 
network. This attack targets routing protocols that block malicious nodes by sending a 
black list of offenders to legitimate nodes. 
6. Denial of Service: This attack has two types: a) Routing table overflow, and b) Sleep 
deprivation torture. In the first type, the attacker floods the network with bogus route 
creation packets in order to prevent the correct creation of routing information, and to 
consume resources of nodes. In Sleep deprivation torture, the attacker sends diverse 
routing information to a specific node in order to make it consume its batteries because of 
the constant routing processing. 
7. Routing Table Poisoning: In this attack, the routing table is affected by receiving 
modified messages the routing tables of participating nodes. Thus, routes may not be 
optimal, or routing loops, and bottlenecks are produced. Since most important attacks are 
identified, the research community is constantly addressing the security issue by 
proposing new routing protocols using three different means or the a combination of 
them: 1) symmetric cryptography, 2) asymmetric cryptography, and 3) reputation 
systems. Proposed routing protocols include the following[18]: 
• Authenticated Routing for Ad hoc Networks (ARAN) 
• ARIADNE: A Secure On-Demand Routing Protocol for Ad Hoc Networks. 
• Detecting and Correcting Malicious Data (DCMD) 
• Secure Ad hoc on demand Distance Vector (SAODV) 
• Secure Efficient Distance Vector Routing for Mobile Wireless Ad Hoc Networks 
(SEAD) 
• Secure Link State routing Protocol (SLSP) 
• Secure Position Aided Ad hoc Routing (SPAAR) 
• WATCHDOG-PATHRATER 
• Ad hoc on demand Distance Vector (AODV-SEC) 
• Building secure routing out of an Incomplete Set of Secure associations (BISS) 
• PACKET-LEASHES 
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• Vehicle Ad hoc network Reputation System (VARS) 
• Endair ALoc [16] 
 
 
Other approaches at the link layer implement mechanisms based on cryptography to 
address authorization and privacy on radio links. In addition, the IEEE 802.11 standard 
considers Wired Equivalent Privacy (WEP) to provide security in wireless networks. 
WEP supports data encryption and integrity by using a secret key shared by all devices of 
a WLAN, or a pair-wise secret key shared by only two communicating devices. 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
2.4 Conclusion 
 
 In this chapter we discuss about the important issues in Wireless Mesh 
Network and their impact on the performance of the Networks we are also 
considering various secure protocols designed for wireless mesh network.  
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Chapter  
    3. SECURE POSITION – AIDED AD HOC ROUTING 
In this chapter we introduce SPAAR. We will begin by discussing some important 
features of SPAAR and describing the high risk environment that is designed for. We 
introduce seven security requirements for secure routing in such a high risk environment. 
Next we describe the SPAAR neighbor table maintenance protocols. We conclude this 
chapter with a description of the route discovery protocols and route table maintained 
protocols. 
3.1 SPAAR FEATURES 
SPAAR uses position information to improve performance and security , while 
keeping position information protected from unauthorized nodes . for MANET routing 
protocols to achieve a high level of security it is imperative that a node only accept 
routing message from verified one hop-neighbors. In SPAAR a node can verify its one 
hop-neighbor before including them in the routing protocol. This is made possible by the 
use of geographical location conformation. SPAAR requires that each device have some 
means of determine its own location. GPS receives have become relatively inexpensive 
and lightweight. Therefore, we feel it is reasonable to assume that all devices in our 
network could be equipped with a GPS receiver. In addition, recent advance in GPS 
security make it more practical for use in a high risk environment [17]. In the case that a 
node is unable to determine its location either due to lack of a GPS receiver or terrain 
obstacle a node may use a location proxy as describe in [6]. 
In SPAAR, the source node must also know the geography location (or a 
approximation) of the destination. This may be calculated from the most recent location 
and most recent velocity information stored in the source node’s route table. However, if 
this is the source nodes first attempt at communication with a particular destination the 
source has no way of calculating the destinations position. in this situation a selective 
flooding algorithm is used to reach the destination and receive its position information. 
While a location service [18,5] is not assumed the use of such a service would 
significantly reduce the overhead involved in SPAAR. 
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SPAAR makes use of a trusted certificate server. An alternate implementation of SPAAR 
that’s takes advantages of the opportunity for the exchange of security parameters prior to 
node deployment may be possible under certain conditions. This implementation would 
not require a trusted certificate server. In the target environment, a tactical plan of some 
sort usually exists. In many cases it is possible to definite the set of nodes that a particular 
node will communicate with as a one hop neighbor. Depending on the size of this set, a 
node could store these nodes public key in non voltaic memory. Although this solution 
does not scale, it may be applicable in the target environment, and when applied it 
eliminate the need for a trusted certificate server in our protocol. 
With SPAAR, one could use any one of the different geographic forwarding 
techniques to make forwarding decision, with little modification to the SPAAR protocol. 
For simplicity’s sake we choose to use LAR scheme 2 with d=0[5]. 
 
3.2 SPAAR Environment: 
Due to the numerous applications of ad hoc networks, different ad hoc routing 
protocols must be designed for and tailored to specify environments. SPAAR was 
designed for use in a high risk tactical MANET. 
A routing protocol may be considered secure if it meets the security requirements 
for its environment of use. In [12] the authors classify ad hoc networks into three 
environments open, managed-open and open-hostile. Each environment differs greatly in 
its security needs and the opportunity for pre-deployment coordination. The authors 
describe secure routing protocol design for the managed open environment, where 
security is a concern, through not the primary concern. SPAAR targets an environment 
similar to the managed hostile environment by satisfying the set of security environment 
listed in Table 3.1 which is an adoption of the security requirements of the managed – 
hostile environment describe in [12]. 
SR1 Fabricated routing message cannot be injected into network by 
malicious nodes 
SR2 Routing message can not be altered in transit by malicious nodes 
SR3 Routing loops cannot be formed by malicious nodes 
SR4 Routs cannot be redirected from the shortest (or idea) path by 
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malicious nodes 
SR5 Unauthorized nodes should be excluded from route computation and 
discovery  
SR6 Network topology must not be exposed to malicious nodes by routing 
messages 
SR7 Nodes must not store inaccurate routing information as a result of 
malicious node activity 
Table 3.1 Security Requirements 
 
The managed hostile environment is described as a MANET formed by military nodes in 
a betel environment and emergency response crew in a disaster area. In this type of 
environment, security is essential and the protection of node location is often necessary. 
Nodes are generally deployed exchange of security parameters often exists. Sensitive 
information is passed between nodes, and malicious nodes are a constant threat. 
It is important to distinguish malicious nodes from compromised nodes. SPAAR 
is designed to define against malicious nodes. For the purpose of this paper, we define a 
malicious node to be an unauthorized node attempting to disrupt or attack the network. 
Adversaries deployed malicious nodes to engage in a malicious activity such as 
eavesdropping, message replay, message distortion and impersonation. SPAAR makes 
use of encryption to thwart such attack. 
We define a compromised node to be a authorized node deployed by a known 
source but it has been overtaken by the adversary. Compromised nodes can produce valid 
signatures and posses valid certificate. A compromised node may or may not engage in 
malicious activity or misbehave. 
As a result detection of compromised nodes can be very difficult. in many cases it 
is difficult to distinguish malicious activity by a compromised node while minimizing the 
potential for damage from attacks by compromised node. 
While a SPAAR protected network will not be safe from all malicious attacks by 
compromised node , intrusion detection system(IDS) can help a identify compromised 
nodes and mitigate routing misbehavior. In[19] Zhang and lee introduces an intrusion 
detection system for ad hoc network. In their approach every nodes participates in 
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intrusion detection and response. Each node is responsible for detecting sign of intrusion 
locally and in dependently. Neighboring nodes can collaborate to investigate in a broader 
range if necessary. Individual agents run independently on every node monitoring local 
activity, collectively forming an IDS to defend wireless ad hoc networks. 
Methods of detecting and mitigating routing misbehavior in MANET’s are 
discussed in [20]. The authors present two routing protocol extensions to mitigate routing 
misbehavior: the watchdog and the pathrater. The watchdog identified misbehaving 
nodes while the pathrater uses this knowledge of misbehaving nodes to choose the 
network path most likely to deliver the packets. Watchdog and pathrater increase overall 
routing overhead, however this is offset by the increase in network throughput in the 
presence of misbehaving nodes. 
3.3 SPAAR Setup: 
SPAAR does not require a preexisting online key management system in the 
MANET. Knowledge of the public key of other networks nodes or a service that provides 
the public key of all nodes on the network is not required.  SPAAR does require that each 
node have access to a trusted certificate server before it can participate in the routing 
protocol. Because the targeted environment generally affords some amount of node 
preparation prior to deployment we assume that nodes have access to such a certificated 
server before entering the MANET. to participate in SPAAR, each node requires a 
public/private key pair, a certificate binding its identity to its public key, and the public 
key of the trusted certificate server. 
All nodes are deployed with the private part of a public/private key pair. Prior to 
deployment, each node will request a certificate from a trusted certificate server T. the 
certificate bind a node’s identity with its public key and is signed by T. The certificate is 
time stamped and has an expiration time. Each node will process T’s public key so it can 
decrypt certificates of other node. This allow a node N1 to inform another node N2 of its 
public key, assuming node N2 was deployed correctly with T’s public key to decrypt 
certificate. 
Certificate = [identity, public key, time, expiration] 
 
3.4   The Neighbor Table  
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With SPAAR, each node maintain a neighbor table that contains the identity and 
position information of each verified neighbor, along with the cryptography key required 
for secure communication with each neighbor(Table 3.2). A node only accepts routing 
messages from a node in its neighbor table. 
 
                                              Table 3.2 Neighbor table 
ID Neighbor’s identification 
PK Neighbor’s public key verified from its certificate 
GDK Neighbor’s group description key 
MLR Neighbor’s most recent location 
LUSN Neighbor’s location update sequence number 
TR Neighbor’s transmission range 
  
3.4.1 Adding Nodes to the Neighbor Table 
  Adding nodes to the neighbor table is a three step process that is illustrated in 
figure 3.2. in step 1, a node N broad cast a HELLO message with its certificate CERT_N. 
any nodes within range of N, wishing to be recognized as a neighbor, decrypt N’s 
certificate to verify N’s public key and create an entry for N in the neighbor table where 
N’s public key will be stored. 
In Step 2, nodes respond to N with a hello reply (HELLO_REP) that includes 
their certificates, MLR and TR signed with their public key and encrypted under N’s 
public key. Upon receiving a HELLO_REP from a neighbor node X1. N will verify that 
X1 truly a one hop neighbor with the method in figure 3.1. 
If N has verified a node as a one hop neighbor, in step three N will store the 
node’s public key, most recent location and transmission range in N’s neighbor table. If 
this is the first neighbor to the added to the neighbor table, N will generate a 
public/private key pair, which we call a neighbor group key pair. The private part of N’s 
neighbor key pair will be called N’s group encryption key and denoted GEK_N. The 
public part of node N’s neighbor group key pair will be called N’s group decryption key, 
denoted GDK_N. N distributes GDK_N to each of this neighbors once they have been 
verified as one-hop neighbor. The GDK is signed with N’s private key to provide 
 XXVI 
authentication and encrypted under the neighbor’s public key for privacy. Upon receiving 
the GDK_N. N’s neighbor store it in their neighbor table. 
At this point X has the capability to accepts routing packets from N. However, X 
will not do so until it has verified N as a neighbor. This will occur after X broadcasts a 
HELLO message and the above steps are executed. This table state will last, at most, the 
time between HELLO message broadcast of X. 
 
3.4.2 Neighbor table Maintenance 
 
Each node periodically broadcast a table update message to inform the neighbor 
of its new MLR. TR  and LUSN. Table update message are encrypted with a nodes group 
encryption key. Neighbors of N decrypted the table update message, analyze the new 
position information to verify that the neighbor is still a one-hop neighbor, and update 
their neighbor table with the new position information. 
    Step 1 
      [HELLO, CERT_N] 
 
      Step 2 
    [hello_rep, Cert_X,[MRL, TR, LUSN]X_k]N_k 
 
    
     Step 3 
    [[GDK_N]N_k]X_k 
 
                                         Figure 3.2 adding A node to The neighbor Table  
The location update sequence number, LUSN, is a time stamped sequence number that is 
incremented each time N broad casts a table update message or construct a RREP 
containing its position information . Representing the freshness of location information, 
the LUSN prevents reply attack of table update message. A node use the LUSN in the 
RREQ to inform its neighbor of the freshness of the coordinates it possess for the 
destination. 
When a table update message is received, the LUSN is time stamped allowing the 
node to determine how much time has passed since it has received a table update from its 
neighbor. It should be noted that the LUSN time stamp is not the exact time of the MRL 
coordinates for the destination. The MLR coordinate are from time  t = (LUSN time 
N 
N X 
N X 
X 
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stamp-propagation delay of the message that included the LUSN). After a time period has 
elapsed without a table update from a neighbor, the link to the neighbor is assumed to be 
broken and the neighbor is deleted from the neighbor table. 
The interval at which a node broadcasts a table update depends on its rate of 
mobility. A node with a high mobility rate will broadcast table update messages more 
frequently in an effort to keep its neighbor up-to-date. To offset the overhead involved 
with such a proactive approach, table update messages are piggybacked on all routing 
message encrypted with a node’s neighbor group key (RREQ and location request 
message). 
3.4.3 Hello message 
 
All nodes broadcast periodic HELLO messages allowing for new neighbors to be 
added to the neighbor table. The HELLO message contains the sender’s public key 
certificate. A node receiving a HELLO message from N checks to see if the GDK field 
has a value. If the node has a value for node’s N’s GDK field, it is already in N’s 
neighbor table, or it has no value for the nodes GDK field in the neighbor table. It will 
send a HELLO_REP message as previously described. As with table update message, the 
interval between HELLO messages is dependent upon node mobility. 
3.5 Route discover and route Maintains:    
In SPAAR, a source node initiates the route discovery process by broadcasting a 
RREQ, upon receiving the RREQ the destination node responds with a RREP. The route 
discovery process is described in detail in the following section. 
 
3.5.1 Route Request (RREQ) 
 
A node N begins the route discovery process by calculating an estimation of the 
destination’s current position (velocity x age of position coordinates). Next, N broadcast 
a RREQ contains the RREQ_SN(see table 3.2), the destination’s identifier, N’s distance 
to D, the destination’s LUSN, all encrypted with its group encryption key(see figure 3.3). 
The RREQ_SN is incremented each time a node transmitted a RREQ’s. It is used to 
prevent replay attacks of RREP and RERR messages. 
 
   
 
       
                            N->BC:[RREQ_SN,D,DIST_ND,MRL_D,LUSN] GEK_N 
 
 
s 
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  N->BC:[RREQ_SN,D,DIST_ID,MRL_D,LUSN] GEK_I 
 
 
 
 
                               Figure 3.3 Route Request(RREQ) Propagation 
 
Recipients of the RREQ, that are neighbor of N, decrypt it with N’s group 
decryption key. A succefull decryption of a RREQ implies that the sender of the RREQ is 
a one hop neighbor. As LAR scheme 2 specifies, an intermediate node cheeks to if it is 
closer to destination D. If an intermediate node has the destinations coordinates with a 
more recent LUSN, it uses those coordinates for the comparison instead of the 
coordinates contained in the RREQ. 
If the intermediate node is not closer to the destination, the RREQ is dropped. If 
either is closer, the node re-broadcasts the RREQ with its identifier and distance to S, 
encrypted with its group encryption key. If the intermediate node has the destination’s 
coordinates with a more recent LUSN, those coordinates replace the older coordinates in 
the RREQ. Intermediate nodes record, in their route table(Table 3.3), the address of the 
neighbor from which they received the RREQ, thereby establishing a reverse path. This 
process is repeated until the destination is reached. 
 
                                            Table 3.2 Route Table 
RREQ_SN Route request sequence number used to identify a RREQ 
S/DID The source and destination I\D’s 
REVERSE The next hop in the reverse path to the source 
FORWARD The next hop in the forward path to the destination 
MRL Destination’s most recent location 
TR Destination’s transmission range  
LUSN Destination’s location update sequence number 
VEl Destination’s velocity 
A/I The active/inactive flag 
 
Each node maintains a route table containing the fields shown in table 3.3. An 
entry in the route table is created when a RREQ is received or a node initiates a route 
discovery. The RREQ_SN from the route request is stored to prevent RRER reply 
attacks. The source and destination addresses associated with route request are also 
 I 
D 
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stored. The reverse field is the address of the node from which the RREQ was received 
and the forward field is the address of the node from which the corresponding RREP was 
received. The location information for the destination is stored in the MRL, TR and 
LUSN fields. Each route in the route table is initially marked active, however a route may 
be deactivated for a number of reasons discussed in section 3.5.5. 
 
3.5.2 Route Replies (RREP) 
 
Upon receiving a RREQ, the destination constructs a RREP containing the 
RREQ_SN, its MRL, its velocity, and a LUSN. The destination’s certificate is also 
included enabling any node to verify the destinations signature on the contents of the 
RREP. The destination signs the RREP with its private key and encrypts with its public 
key of the neighbor from which it received the RREQ. The RREP propagates along the 
reverse path of the RREQ, being verified at each hop(figure 3.4) 
 
 
   
                          
                               D->I:[CERT_D,[RREQ_SN,MRL_D,VEL_D,LUSN]D_k]I_k 
                 
 
 
  D->N:[[CERT_D,[RREQ_SN,MRL_D,VEL_D,LUSN]D_k]I_k]N_k 
 
           
 
 
                                                        Figure 3.4 Route Reply 
 
 
 
 
 
Intermediate nodes upon receiving a RREP decrypt it with their private key and 
verify the signature with the public key of the neighbor node they receive it from .Next, 
the contents of the RREQ are decrypted with the public key of the destination. If the 
decryption is successful, a forward entry is then added to the intermediate nodes route 
table that points to the nodes from which the RREP was received. An un successful 
decryption implies that the contents of the RREP have been tempered with, and the 
RREP is discarded .Intermediate nodes sign the RREP and encrypts it with the public key 
 D 
  I 
 N 
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of the next node in the reverse path. The RREP is then forwarded to the next node in the 
reverse path. 
               An intermediate node may receive many RREPs in response to one 
RREQ. The first RREP received is the one that will be used; however intermediate nodes 
create entries in their routing tables for the first three RREPs they receive from different 
nodes for a given RREQ. 
 Following the successful receipt and authentication of a RREP, the source node 
verifies that the RREQ_SN matches the RREQ_SN from the initial RREQ. This is done 
to prevent reply of RREPs by malicious nodes. The source node then creates a new entry 
in the route table. The source node time stamps the LUSN so it can determine how much 
time is passed since the last update. As with intermediate nodes, the source node will use 
the route from the first RREP it receives from different nodes for a given RREQ. In a 
case that a source node does not receive RREP in response to a RREQ flooding must be 
used.  
    
3.5.3 Location Request Messages 
 
There will be cases when nodes has no previous  location in formation for a 
destination to include the RREQ .In this case a node broadcasts a location request 
message to its neighbors in an attempt to discover the location of the destination. 
 N--- BC:[LOC_REQ,D]GEK_N 
Any neighbor that possess the location coordinates for the destination will respond to S 
with a signed location reply ,encrypted with N’s public key. 
NeighborN;[[LOC_REP,D,MRLD,VELOCITY_D,LUS N,AGE ]Neighbor_k] 
It does not assume clock synchronization between nodes ,thus the local timestamp on a 
LUSN is I irrelevant  to another node. If neither N nor any N’s neighbor have the location 
coordinates for destination D,N must revert to a selecting flooding algorithm. N broadcast 
a RREQ with the distance to the destination set to infinity, it will check to see if it has 
coordinates for the destination and the destination coordinates. If it does not ,it will 
rebroadcast the RREQ with the distance to the destination set to infinity. This process is 
repeated until the destination is reached. 
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3.5.4 Route Error Messages (RERR) 
Nodes mark routes as either active or inactive in the route table .A route may be 
deactivated for a number of different reasons. If a stored route remains unused after a 
certain timeout periods, the route is deactivated. If data is received for a de-activated 
route, a route error massage is constructed and propagated upstream towards the source, 
in the same function as a RREP .A RERR consists of the massage type identifier and a 
route request sequence no. The RRSQ_SN is included in the RERR messages to identify 
the route that should be deactivated. When a node receives a RERR message, it 
deactivates the route associated with the Specified RREQ_SN. 
I2I1 : [[RERR.RREQ_SN]I2_K-]I 1_K] 
The RERR is signed with the sending nodes private key and encrypted with the 
appropriate neighbor‘s public key. When a node receives and successfully decrypts a 
RERR it will update its routing table by marking the route associated with the RREQ_SN 
as inactive. If the node is not the source of the path to be deactivated it signs encrypt and 
transmit the RERR to the appropriate neighbor. When the source receives the RERR, it 
will deactivates the route and try an alternate if one is stored in its route table .If there 
isn’t an alternate route or the alternates routers fail, the source re-initiates the route 
discovery process for the destination.   
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Chapter  
    4   Simulation Setup and Results 
  
4.1 Introduction 
The security issue related to wireless mesh network can be solved by implementing 
SPAAR as described in the previous chapter. The simulations have shown the effect of 
the different attacks on the performance of WMN.  
The performance metrics studied are: 
1. Expected Transmission Count (ETX): It accounts for data loss due to medium access 
contention and environmental hazards, and considers the number of retransmissions 
needed to successfully transmit a packet over a link.  
2. Hop Count: Hop count is the most commonly used metric in wireless multi-hop 
networks. The path selected is the one minimizing the number of links between a given 
source and destination node.  
 
4.2 Simulation Setup  
 
The simulation considers a setup with a three stored building serviced by nine 
routers, three on each floor. The simulation also considers the presence of a gateway on 
the second floor connected to one router on each router so as to provide path to the 
Internet from all the routers. This arrangement considers minimum interference between 
routers located on the same floor as well as routers in the neighboring floors. It also 
eliminates the bandwidth contention that occurs when two routers with overlapping 
coverage are configured with the same channel. When this happens, 802.11 wireless 
Ethernet carrier sense multiple access/collision avoidance (CSMA/CA) mechanism 
ensures that users in both access areas can access the network. The setup assumes 90 
mobile nodes to be present in the building (30 nodes on each floor). It is assumed that all 
the mobile nodes are free to roam about as long as they stay in their respective floors. It is 
also assumed that that all the nodes in a floor do not at any point converge to come under 
a single router and that all the routers have some nodes connected to them at all time.  
 XXXIII
 
The setup currently considers the system to be fault resistant though later we explain the 
rearrangement of nodes in case of a router or node failure.  
For communication purposes in a Wireless Mesh Network, multi hop and multi 
frequency communication are important. For this to happen, each node or router has to 
process more than one request at a time. We have assumed each router to be capable of 
handling 4 requests at a time (due to presence of multiple frequencies) and the nodes to 
be able to attend to only one request at a time. 
 
4.3 ALGORITHM FOR SIMULATION 
 
Send message = HELLO_REQ 
Verified_neighbor = FALSE 
        If message = HELLO_REPLY 
           Till N=! Xi 
         Distance=compute_distance(N’s coordinate,X1’s coordinate) 
         If distance < N’s transmission range&&distance<X1’s transmission range  
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       Then 
            Verified _neighbor=True 
                                 N X1; 
                                X1X2; 
                           II+1;(1,2,…N) 
End if; 
 
4.4 Simulations 
 
The simulation for different attacks are given below 
 
Network throughput without any attack 
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Network throughput when MAC Misbehaviour occure 
 
 
 
 
Network throughput when External Noise Detection 
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4.5 Conclusion  
 
This chapter presented the results and observations obtained for the different 
attacks performed on SPAAR protocol. We basically consider two type of attacks on 
the protocols 1) MAC Misbehaviour 2) External Noise Detection .As per the 
observation we find out that the performance of the network decrease as the Attack 
has been performed.  
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